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DDoS Mitigation Leak
In this edition of Beyond Their Intended Scope, we take a look at last week’s BGP leak by a DDoS mitigation company which impacted networks around the world. We look at the impacts in both BGP and traffic data, and discuss how RFC 9234’s “Only to Customer” BGP Path Attribute could have helped.
If accepted into a router configuration, this AS-SET would generate an allowlist millions of lines long, covering the vast majority of IP space in the global routing table. Reading the highlighted AS path from left to right, we can see that this route is normally originated by TPG Telecom of Australia (AS7545) and prepended three times to Tata (AS6453) before arriving at Lumen (AS3356) over a peering connection 3356:666 in San Jose, California 3356:2011 according to the community strings. While the lower portion of the visualization shows a pruned ball-n-stick AS-level diagram, the upper graph depicts the ASes observed upstream of AS10310 for this route by count of BGP vantage points.
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